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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Motivation and purpose 
When in the 1880s farmers in southern Ghana began 
to plant cocoa, their main concerns were finding land 
to plant and mobilising labour to do so. The issue of 
finding land remained paramount until at least the 
1990s, when the land frontier of forest to clear for cocoa 
finally closed. The last forests to be planted were in the 
old Western Region and particularly in Sefwi, now the 
Western North Region.
This paper examines how farmers in Sefwi obtained 
land and mobilised labour in the late 2010s, and how 
that has changed since the 1960s. 
Specifically, the paper aims to:
i. record how land and labour for cocoa were 
obtained in 2019;
ii. describe changes in land and labour institutions, 
setting them within the context of changes to the 
local natural environment, the local economy and 
society; and to
iii.  assess the implications of the changes seen.
Methods
The results of this paper emerged from a broader 
study of cocoa farming in Sefwi. That meant that the 
research had to explore a wide range of factors that 
influence cocoa growing — ecology and agronomy, 
society and economy and public policy. Our approach 
prioritised the experience of farmers and their 
accounts of their lives as cocoa farmers. Research was 
qualitative, consisting of semi-structured interviews 
and discussions held with 65 farmers, labourers, 
purchasing clerks and extension officers. Additionally, 
we asked twelve elderly farmers to recount their life 
histories. We also convened nine focus groups with 
men and women farmers. 
We supplemented this by a questionnaire survey of 276 
farmers sampled from five communities in Juaboso 
Municipal. The survey asked farmers about land tenure 
and changes, use of inputs, output of cocoa, and 
government services.
The findings
Land: the new norms
Land in Sefwi is held by the chiefs on behalf of the 
community. Before the 1960s, the population was low 
and forest lands were abundant. Chiefs would readily 
grant land to farm to both locals and strangers, the 
latter paying a small annual ground rent.
Since then, the population has risen, forest has been 
cleared and some of it has been declared as reserves, 
so that by 2019 there remained little or no new land 
to allocate. Farmers now get land either through 
inheritance under matrilineal or patrilineal norms; by 
abunu sharecropping where a tenant plants a cocoa 
farm which is then divided between the tenant and 
landlord when the trees produce fruit; and by land sales.
In all cases, land users need to square their rights with 
the local chief, with family and lineage, and sometimes 
with the state as well. Payments, rituals with witnesses, 
and documentation confirm rights.
Land, once vested in the lineage and held on behalf 
of the (very) extended family, with inheritance down 
the matrilineal line through the mother’s brother (wofa), 
has given way to land controlled by the nuclear family, 
passed down the paternal line. Although this breaks 
longstanding Akan custom, it has taken place with little 
social rupture.
Matrilineal inheritance was progressively challenged by 
men who had cut land from the forest, or bought it, 
and claimed individual rights, to be passed on as they 
chose. They often passed land on as gifts to their wives 
and offspring in their later years to forestall matrilineal 
inheritance. In the last two or three decades, most land 
has been passed down along paternal lines from one 
generation’s nuclear family to the next generation’s 
nuclear family. Little resistance to this from elders or 
chiefs was apparent.
At the same time, it seems the rights of girls to inherit 
land have increasingly been recognised. While women 
farmers interviewed had less land than their male 
partners, they did have land — either inherited from 
their father, or shared with them by their husband.
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Is access to land equitable? No, the Gini coefficient 
of equality of land access was 0.56, which is high. 
However, land is not being monopolised. Some farmers 
have more land than others because their family were 
present when the forests were handed out to farm. 
These farmers received large allocations — tens of 
hectares and rarely took over other people’s land. The 
life histories showed large holdings being dissipated by 
sharecropping, sales and division among offspring, not 
accumulating. Those who had increased their holdings 
through time, started from having little or no land, so 
that their 2019 holding was modest. 
Social tension over land was focused not on some 
people having more than others, but on inheritance. 
Land disputes, of which relatively few were recorded in 
the interviews, were almost always either the result of a 
division of land among the offspring of some deceased 
male owner that left someone aggrieved that they had 
not got their rightful share, or the result of widows 
who had lost land to the extended family when their 
husbands died.
Youth were disgruntled that there was little land to inherit 
and that their parents were not giving them land. Youth 
grievances, however, were somewhat muted, since it 
was clear, by word and deed, that many did not wish 
to become farmers. They were not studying in tertiary 
colleges and universities, taking up apprenticeships, or 
joining with friends to buy a taxi, to become farmers. 
On the contrary, their dreams were urban.
Was land distribution efficient? Did distribution 
lead to cocoa lands being used productively?
 Inefficiencies could be seen among farmers lacking 
labour: elderly farmers could not work and their children 
had long left home and farmers on low incomes who 
could not afford to hire. In some cases, they had let 
their cocoa plots go fallow, growing some food crops 
among the untended trees. Unproductive plots may 
be defined as those with yields of less than 312kg 
per hectare. Out of 560 plots, 210 (38 per cent) were 
yielding less than 312kg. 
That, however, overstates allocative inefficiency. 
Many of the 210 low yielding plots were technically 
inefficient: they were old groves that needed replanting, 
groves suffering the ravages of black pod and insects, 
or were too weedy, infested by mistletoe, or dying from 
swollen shoot. Unproductive plots tended to be larger 
plots. Plot size was inversely related to yield, although 
weakly so, with a correlation coefficient of -0.23. These 
inefficiencies stemmed largely from lack of labour 
or lack of working capital or both. Farmers with low 
yields knew they could do better but they did not have 
the ready cash to hire labour or buy inputs, such as 
the sprays needed to control insects and black pod, 
when they were needed. Lack of working capital to buy 
inputs was often associated with pressing demands for 
cash to pay school fees and meet medical bills.
Labour: new opportunities, old institutions
In relation to labour, farmers first cultivate using their 
own, personal labour. However, unless the cocoa grove 
is very small (under an half an hectare), key tasks such 
as weeding, harvesting and breaking pods require 
more labour than one woman or man can provide.
The next recourse is to draw on the rest of the 
household. Gender norms dictate that tasks such as 
climbing trees to cut parasites and harvesting pods are 
men’s work, owing to the risks of falling or being hit on 
the head by a falling pod. A woman working on her 
husband’s land may expect a share of the harvest or a 
land grant as compensation. Offspring expect land in 
the future, and some payment for their work. 
While the institutions governing the availability of 
labour did not change, the degree to which farmers 
used them did. Farmers used less labour from their 
family and exchange labour groups declined, being 
limited to small groups that worked collectively on 
the hard work of breaking cocoa pods. The use of 
sharecropping caretakers or caretakers paid an annual 
fee was uncommon. Farmers increasingly recruited 
extra labour as hired hands, from gangs being paid 
piece rates.
Some farmers claimed it was harder to recruit labour 
than before, owing to competition from mining, from 
jobs in rural market centres. However, they usually 
agreed that if you had the cash to pay, you could find 
labour. Hence, obtaining labour was also a question 
of capital.
While some observers thus see labour as being 
commodified, some arrangements only function with 
significant trust and social affiliation, for example, 
the farmer who puts up the annual labourer, a youth 
from the north, in his own house; the Togolese gangs 
prepared to work and wait until the harvest, trusting 
the farmers to then pay them for their work; and the 
farmers who trust their caretakers to share their harvest 
honestly. These are not the relations of hard capitalism, 
a gig economy in the forest, but one where personal 
relations count as much as wages.
Considerations of hiring labour should not be 
overplayed. Farmers did not use much hired labour: 
the median days reported in the survey was just 11 
days per hectare, with a mean of 15 days per hectare. 
The bulk of the labour needed to farm came from the 
farmer and their immediate family. Labour hiring was 
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concentrated on the two heavy demands: weeding 
early in the season and harvesting at the end of the 
season. Indeed, as cocoa farms become smaller with 
increasing population, hired labour may be becoming 
less important.
Women at a disadvantage, even if some 
improvement has been seen
Women are usually disadvantaged in both land and 
labour, typically receiving smaller shares of inherited 
land than men. When husbands die, men may grab 
their land under cover of lineage rules. As farmworkers, 
women are restricted to the lowest paid tasks and their 
skills are not financially rewarded.
Some of the interviews suggest these inequalities are 
lessening. Patriarchs are more likely to pass on some 
of their land to their daughters. Some farmers see that 
women can carry out tasks seen as skilled and male. 
Nevertheless, the inequalities remain. It is easier for 
men to grow cocoa than women.
Conclusions
We end on a reflection. While Ghana still had a forest 
frontier on which to plant new cocoa groves, mobilising 
land and labour that began in the 1880s remained 
critical to the sector. Today that has ended. No frontier 
remains: the groves run up to the Ivorian border. That 
removes one source of profit: the forest rents from 
newly cleared land. 
In the last 70 years, circumstances have changed in 
Sefwi. The land frontier has closed as forests have 
been cleared for cocoa and other crops or declared 
reserves. Family labour has also become scarcer as 
children go to school and their work in the cocoa groves 
is restricted by labour laws. Other activities compete for 
household labour, including crops such as rubber and 
oil palm, galamsey mining, jobs in local market centres, 
and migration to the cities. Cocoa farming has become 
more difficult as groves of old trees (over 30 years old) 
begin to decline and need replanting, and as pests and 
diseases increase — especially swollen shoot.
In response, the institutions governing access to 
land and labour have changed, but gradually, with 
adaptation and evolution of longstanding institutions 
rather than transformation and revolution.
Hence the challenge for the farmers of Juaboso 
Municipal, both Sefwi and strangers, is this: forest rents 
must be replaced by technical rents. The future lies 
with technical improvement, and with that, injections 
of capital. It is no longer primarily about mobilising land 
and labour. The new agenda invites questions about 
innovation, about state services, and about farmer 
access to capital to invest in upgraded cocoa. 
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Since the beginning of cocoa cultivation in Ghana in 
the 1880s, cocoa farmers have mobilised land and 
labour to plant trees. Farmers were incentivised by the 
profits to be made from cocoa – margins that derived 
partly from the initial natural fertility of the forests of 
southern Ghana, and partly from the prices paid in 
industrialised countries of Europe and North America 
for chocolate cascading down to the price paid for 
cocoa beans. In the late nineteenth century, growing 
cocoa promised high returns to semi-skilled labour, 
offering a way to enjoy more material comforts and to 
accumulate capital.
The history of cocoa from the early twentieth century 
in Ghana1 has largely concerned mobilising land 
and labour. From 1936 onwards, land and labour 
mobilisation have been interrupted by outbreaks of 
swollen shoot disease. These outbreaks led to early 
cocoa groves being abandoned and replaced by new 
groves in the forest to the west. In addition, predatory 
taxation and a disastrous macroeconomy in the 1970s 
have disrupted land and labour dynamics. A generation 
or more of Ghana scholars have thus been fascinated 
by how land and labour have been recruited to cocoa, 
most notably Hill (1963).2 In the 1970s and 1980s, 
attention shifted towards problematic policy, only to 
return to land and labour once dysfunctional policy was 
largely corrected by Rawlings’ 1983 reforms, leading 
once again to producers investing in cocoa (Kolavalli 
and Vigneri, 2011).
The frontier for new cocoa farms moved ever further 
west reaching the high forest of the Western Region in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Chiefs still had forest land that 
they could allocate both to locals as well as to incomers 
or ‘strangers’ wanting to plant new groves.
Since 2000, the Western Region has been producing 
about half of Ghana’s cocoa. The forest is not limitless. 
Not only has it increasingly been converted to cocoa, 
the government has also designated blocks of forests 
as reserves to conserve them. Hence by 2000 the 
frontier was closing in the high forest of the Western 
Region. By 2010 few new lands could legally be 
1  See Amanor, Yaro and Teye (2020) for a more detailed account.
2  See also Austin (2014) and Green (2017).
developed, and by 2019 cocoa farmers and key 
informants all agreed that the frontier had finally closed.
This paper addresses the following questions:
i. How were land and labour accessed in Sefwi in 
2019? 
ii. How and why has that changed over the last 70 
years? 
iii. What have been the consequences and 
significance of these changes?
The rest of the paper first sets out the methodology 
and data sources used. Section 3 deals with land 
access, section 4 with labour use, and the final section 
concludes by synthesising the overall findings.
1 INTRODUCTION
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This paper reports on part of a wider study of cocoa 
farming in Sefwi that aimed not only to examine land 
and labour, but also the changing prospects for 
growing cocoa and the challenges facing farmers. 
Because the questions were broad, a wide array of 
data were collected and the views of the cocoa farmers 
themselves were prioritised. We could have set tighter 
questions, perhaps with hypotheses to test, but to do 
so would have risked biasing the data towards our 
own perspectives and interests and not allowing the 
farmers to talk about what concerns them.
In this study we therefore adopted a mixed methods 
design. Qualitative enquiries were devised to hear 
the voices of the farmers and of those working with 
them, including extensionists and purchasing clerks. 
A survey of cocoa growing households was carried 
out to understand the frequency of the observations 
reported in the interviews and to measure outcomes.
A reconnaissance in late 2019 preceded the main study 
and involved four focus group discussions (Figure 2.1), 
interviews with two chiefs, and interviews with ten 
2 METHODOLOGY






Extension officers from the Cocoa Disease and Pest Control Programme 2
Chiefs 2
Focus group discussion 9
Total qualitative interviews 86
Source: Authors’ own
Figure 2.1: Focus group discussion held during the reconnaissance survey in Juaboso Nkwanta
Source: Authors’ own
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farmers in two communities: Juaboso Nkwanta and 
Abrokofe which represent an old and young cocoa 
growing community in the district.
For the main study, five communities from Juaboso 
Nkwanta and Abrokofe were chosen (Figure 2.2). Data 
were collected in the field for three months beginning 
in November 2019.
Qualitative enquiries (Table 2.1) included interviews with 
individual farmers, purchasing clerks and labourers, 
cocoa extensionists and chiefs, life histories of elderly 
farmers and separate discussions with groups of male 
farmers and groups of female farmers.
To establish a historical account, we also reviewed 
older literature.
Based on insights from the preliminary analysis of 
the qualitative data from the reconnaissance study, 
a structured questionnaire was designed and used 
to collect largely quantitative data from five farming 
communities.
For the household survey, systematic sampling was 
used to select 276 farmers from five communities (Table 
2.2). The sample size in each of the five communities 
was proportional to the population. In each community, 
the estimated number of the houses was divided by 
the pre-determined sample size to obtain the sampling 
interval used to select the houses to participate in 
the study. Trained enumerators and their supervisors 
walked from one end of the community to another 
and selected houses that would participate in the 
study according to the sampling interval. One farmer 
was interviewed in each selected house. Where more 
than one farmer lived in a selected house, established 
sampling protocols were followed to ensure that farmers 
represented age and gender groups. The questionnaire 
sought to obtain information from farmers on temporal 
changes in land tenure arrangements, use of inputs, 
output of cocoa, profitability of cocoa farming, and 
government policies. STATA and Excel were used to 
analyse quantitative data.
Figure 2.2: Juaboso Municipal District, Western North Region, with study site
Source: © Ghana Statistical Services, adapted by authors
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Table 2.2. Number of survey respondents in sampled communities
Community Male Female Total
Juaboso Nkwanta 43 (25%) 23 (22%) 66 (24%)
Abrokofe 36 (21%) 20 (19%) 56 (20%)
Antobia 27 (16%) 23 (22%) 50 (19%)
Aferiwa 33 (19%) 19 (18%) 52 (19%)
Bonzai 33 (19%) 19 (18%) 52 (19%)
Total 172 (100%) 104 (100%) 276 (100%)
Source: Authors’ own
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3.1 Changing land relations from the 
1930s 
From the 1930s when a few migrants started 
establishing cocoa farms in Western Region, land was 
given out freely by chiefs for a token fee called aseda 
(Hill and McGlade, 1957). Most indigenes preferred to 
grow food crops for family subsistence and some may 
not have been aware of the returns to planting cocoa.
Society was organised by lineages that controlled land 
allocated by chiefs and transferred land matrilineally 
according to lineage norms.3  From the 1950s, however, 
as cocoa boomed, several individuals and their families 
cleared huge lands under individual titles which they 
then transmitted patrilineally (Boni, 2005).
By the 1970s, chiefs, seeing the chance to make money, 
declared their singular right to allocate remaining forests 
to migrants through sales, renting and sharecropping. 
This greatly limited indigene access and rights to virgin 
land. Indigenes who had already cleared forest lands 
could sell off their lands to incoming farmers. Purchase 
thus became an important means to acquire land for 
migrant and local farmers with money. Migrant farmers 
were, however, still obliged to pay chiefs an annual rent 
of a tenth of cocoa produced — the same value as the 
10 per cent taxes imposed by the Nkrumah regime in 
the 1960s.
According to elderly participants in group discussions, 
migrants in the past could access land for free in these 
communities without any charge:
‘because of the love that was existent in the 
world in the early days when I was a kid, we 
didn’t take anything from anyone who came 
around and wanted land. Today the land is 
divided and each family has its own. We all had 
our lands that we were farming on and so we 
3 Matrilineal norms dictate that a woman’s sons will inherit land not from their father, but from their
 uncle — their mother’s brother.
4 Also termed yemayenkye: do and let’s share.
5 Arhin (1988) describes how only a few migrants were able to purchase land outright, while the majority  
 accessed it on sharecropping terms or had to pay ground rent to their landlords (ground rent was 
 called ‘nto’).
used to give land to people who came to us to 
host them. We gave them these lands to farm 
on and cater for themselves. That has resulted in 
the expansion of the community because there 
is an adage that foreigners are often needed to 
expand a community’.
(Elderly man at a focus group discussion, 
Juaboso Nkwanta)
As land became scarcer over time, allocation of land 
to strangers was no longer free, but subject to sharing 
of land between the original holder and the tenant, 
under abunu (halves) contracts. In these, the tenant 
would plant and establish the cocoa farm, then when 
the trees began to fruit, the farm would be divided in 
half between landowner and tenant, for the lifetime of 
the trees or longer (Knudsen, 2007).This arrangement 
has endured, albeit with changes to length of tenancy 
and the circumstances under which land can be taken 
back — a neglected farm or one where the cocoa has 
died without replacement is liable to be repossessed.
Takane (2002) argues that abunu4 transfers of land 
in exchange for labour were a gain by labour against 
landowners. Because most migrants had no means 
to buy land, sharecropping — perhaps better termed 
share-tenancies — has been a key means to obtain 
land, just as it was in regions to the east.5
By the end of the 1970s, many landowners unable to 
establish cocoa farms for lack of labour or capital, who 
now realised the economic returns to cocoa, invited 
sharecroppers to establish cocoa farms on their land. 
Land sales thus declined drastically in the 1980s and 
are currently limited to few desperate sales.
The neoliberal era, from the late 1980s, saw insecurity 
for migrants whose lands were threatened by 
reinterpretations of cultivation rights, forcing many 
to seek re-documentation from higher chiefs at a 
3 ACCESS TO COCOA LAND IN SEFWI
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cost. The length of tenure on land acquired through 
sharecropping, initially in perpetuity subject to annual 
rents, was commuted to the lifetime of the trees 
(Boni, 2005).
Changes have taken place to the inheritance of land 
as well. Nuclear families have struggled against 
matrilineal norms that vest rights in the extended family 
or lineage, in favour of patrilineal norms where the male 
head of household can pass on land to wives and 
offspring (Bukh, 1979, Grier, 1992). Land grants have 
long been seen as fair reward to wives and children 
for their labour in establishing cocoa farms (Hill, 1963). 
Struggles over land have led to tenure divided between 
big landowners of cocoa farms, mostly chiefs and early 
takers of land from the 1950s to the 1970s; and later 
entrants into cocoa and commoners who mostly own 
small, fragmented parcels of land. 
Wealth accumulation still hinges mostly on this 
historical advantage of capturing land earlier and 
chiefs controlling access to land which gives them 
further advantage in modern circuits of wealth 
accumulation. Crook (2001) describes how the colonial 
administration’s support for chiefly control over land 
created and sustained social differentiation. Table 3.1 
summarises land access past and present.
3.2 Contemporary dynamics in access 
to land for cocoa in Sefwi
The household survey showed that vacant lands 
were non-existent and that people accessed lands 
previously acquired and owned. In addition, land 
ownership lay predominantly in the hands of families 
and individuals.
The survey covered 276 households who operated 569 
plots or farms, with most households operating more 
than one plot. The majority of plots (79 per cent) had 
been acquired through family: most of them inherited, 
and the remainder mainly gifted. Fathers were the 
most frequent plot providers, followed by mothers and 
grandparents (Table 3.2).
It is striking to see how few plots were obtained through 
lineage and matrilineal norms: just 9 out of 569 plots. 
Equally notable is how few plots were purchased or 
gained through abunu: just 5 per cent for each case.
Table 3.1 Land acquisition in Sefwi: forms and conditions
Type of 
acquisition
Who qualifies Obligations on 
tenure holder
Rights of tenure holder
Inherited land, 
lineage
Relatives of land 
holder.
Farm the land. 
Respect lineage 
custom.
Rights given either matrilineally from the maternal 
uncle, or patrilineally from the father. Usufruct rights: 




Relatives of land 
holder.
Farm the land. 
Respect (immediate) 
family.
Rights given by a parent or family head, usually male, 
to their offspring. May be gifted to offspring during 
the parent’s life or passed on to them on death of the 
parent. 
Freehold 
grants by local 
chiefs
Indigenes only. Mainly 
before the1970s.
Holder must clear 
forest and farmland.
Land held in perpetuity. Some owners can allocate 
land as individual land to wives and offspring.
Leasehold 
grants by local 
chiefs
Migrants. Mainly before 
the1970s.
Clear forest and 
farmland. Pay small 
annual ground rent 
(nto) to (local) chief.





All. Mainly since the 
1970s.
Pay the price of land. Land held in perpetuity. Some owners can allocate 





All. Since the 1970s. Clear forest and farm 
until groves are well 
established, 4–5 
years.
Tenant can grow food crops while cocoa matures. 
Once cocoa farm is established, split 50:50 abunu 
between landowner and tenant.
Source: Authors’ summary of information from both household survey and from interviews and discussions with 
farmers 
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It seems, then, that longstanding norms of matrilineal 
inheritance and lineage ownership have all but 
disappeared, to be replaced by land passed down the 
generations within the nuclear family. Birth is the main 
determinant of land access, with few willing or able to 
buy land or gain it through sharecropping.
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrated that land ownership 
was uneven. Male farmers owned more land than 
female farmers with an average of 14.7 acres [6ha] 
versus 8.7 acres [3.5ha]. The distribution of land 
across households showed that most households 
owned fewer than 20 acres [8ha] (Figure 3.1) with a 
mean holding of 12.5 acres [5ha], median of 10 acres 
[4ha], and an interquartile range spanning 5 to 15 acres 
[2 to 6ha]. A long tail was observed in the distribution 
(Figure 3.2) with five households owning more than 
20 acres [8ha], with a maximum of 200 acres [81ha]. 
Owing to this long tail, the Gini coefficient for land is 
0.56, indicating highly unequal land ownership. Half of 
the cocoa land was in the hands of 58 households, 
while the other half was spread across the other 218 
households.
3.2.1. Inheritance of cocoa farms 
The results from the focus groups and the survey 
showed that land was inherited under two norms: 
matrilineal inheritance or patrilineal inheritance. 
Traditionally, land inheritance in Sefwi occurred 
Table 3.2: Source of plots




Head of lineage 2 2
Mother 86 86




















Head of lineage 1 1
Spouse 1 1
[not known] 63 31 28 122
Total 447 54 31 28 569
Source: Authors’ own, survey data 2019 
15Working Paper 073 | November 2021
matrilineally. Beneficiaries received land from their 
mother’s brother, their uncle.
This norm, however, is weakening in favour of patrilineal 
norms. For example, one focus group participant 
explained:
‘Since we are a matrilineal society, if my mother 
owns land it also belongs to her daughters. But 
depending on the individual family decisions, 
parents can decide to hand over their lands to 
their male, female or all children’.
(Female cocoa farmer at a focus group 
discussion in Abrokofe, November 2019)
Matrilineal inheritance was seen as a major hurdle to 
young people taking over farms. Young people who 
have laboured for years on their parents’ land were 
loath to see this pass to their cousins, increasingly 
refusing to work for free on family land.
Patrilineal inheritance, on the other hand, occurs if the 
lands in question are deemed to be held not by the 
extended family and hence by the lineage, but by the 
individual.
Passing on of individually owned lands to children is 
easier and less complicated than family-owned lands 
which are often rife with conflicts. A farmer recounted: 
‘my grandfather gave the farmland to my father and my 
father passed it down to me’ (42-year-old male cocoa 
farmer from Abrokofe, November 2019). Similarly, a 
female farmer recalled:
‘The first land was given to me by my father 
and the other land was given to me by my 
grandfather. With my grandfather’s land, it is a 
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long-held family land which dates as far back 
as my great grandfathers. They kept handing it 
down when they died, and it has gotten to my 
turn. I am not the only grandchild that received 
portions of that farm. It was shared amongst all 
the grandchildren and that was what I received’.
(Female cocoa farmer from Abrokofe, November 
2019).
According to focus group discussion, individual 
inheritance is normally only possible where the 
parent owned the said land. Family lands cannot be 
handed down to children except where the family 
head decides with the consent of all to share family 
land out thereby individualising the subdivided lands. 
This must be consummated by the right rituals to 
signify individualisation and subsequent patrilineal 
succession.
Specific rites are performed by the successor in the 
presence of witnesses to signify the transfer of ownership 
from parents or grandparents to the child when owner 
is still alive. When the owner dies intestate, tradition 
applies, so the head of the lineage in consultation with 
elders decides on how farms are shared.
Transfers of family lands to individuals may be 
contested and brought under matrilineal norms if the 
wife and children are not able to defend their rights 
using their social capital.
Family members increasingly acquired family lands 
from the family pool through the performance of 
rites involving payments, drinks and witnesses to 
individualise such lands. For example, one female 
farmer stated:
‘My father handed over a secondary forest to 
me to use as a cocoa farm. The land belonged 
to my father’s family and he happened to be the 
family head so he gave me a portion to use for 
cocoa farming. Now that my father has passed 
away, I would have to meet the family and do 
the necessary rites by providing some drinks 
and money to solidify my claim over the land’.
(Female cocoa farmer from Abrokofe, November 
2019).
Male focus group discussion participants at Antobia 
defined an individually owned land as one that was 
acquired through the clearance of virgin land, that is 
first occupancy, or that which is purchased. These are 
the lands that can be willed out and given as gifts.
Patrilineal inheritance seemed to dominate despite 
serious confrontations with those who want to inherit 
matrilineally, the orthodox norm. For example, one 
participant stated:
‘We used to inherit [from] our uncles in the olden 
days. But in 1979, when they were amending 
the constitution, a lot of people shifted to their 
patrilineal side. So, they were inheriting from 
their fathers instead of uncles. When they were 
inheriting from the matrilineal side, it was not 
helping us’.
Box 3.1. Intestate Succession Law, 1985
Provisional National Defence Council Decree, Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDCL 111)
Establishes what happens to land when the holder dies without clearly indicating to who the rights should be 
transferred. The law sets out what happens under different conditions, namely: [numbers are sections of the Law]
5. Intestate survived by spouse and child
6. Intestate survived by spouse only
7. Intestate survived by child only
8. Intestate survived by parent only
9. Devolution of residue where customary law is inapplicable
10. Where customary law provides for succession by family
11. Intestate survived by neither spouse, parent nor child
The law also protects the rights of surviving spouses against eviction, and to a house on property and defines 
how rights will be divided if there is more than one legitimate claimant. 
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(Focus group discussion with male cocoa 
farmers, Antobia, November 2019).
The Intestate Succession Law, presented in Box 
3.1, has a wider application in the community as the 
female focus group indicated that many widows resort 
to the courts to defend their stake in their husbands’ 
cocoa farms. They also indicated that some chiefs 
also adjudicated cases using the principles of this law. 
In their study of land tenure in cocoa growing areas, 
Quaye et al. (2014) also noted the widespread use 
of the Intestate Succession Law and the declining 
influence of matrilineal inheritance which they attribute 
to all available lands having been duly allocated to the 
various inhabitants. Inheritance of cocoa farms as 
property is rife with conflicts as family heads contest 
the legitimacy and rights of spouses and children to 
inherit these properties.
Typically, families still appoint a successor to oversee 
the sharing of the properties of the deceased which 
is a concern for many wives and children. The quotes 
below from the youth focus group discussion illustrate 
these concerns:
‘Traditionally a successor is selected to take 
over the affairs of the deceased and that is also 
one of the reasons the youth have not been 
able to make their own farms. My parents have 
cultivated a farm but the family ends up giving 
it to someone else to control. Sometimes they 
– the uncles and family head – can even take 
the entire land from the widow and her children’.
(M2 speaking at a youth focus group discussion 
at Juaboso Nkwanta, November 2019). 
‘Ideally the farm should go to the widow and 
her children. But just as my brother said, the 
family of the deceased will select a successor 
who might be lazy and will take everything 
that the deceased has reserved for his widow 
and children. Sometimes it becomes a 
dispute between the families and some of the 
successors end up killing the widow so that 
they can lay claim to the farm. The children 
might be young and wouldn’t be able to fight 
back when their mother dies’. 
(F4 speaking at a youth focus group discussion 
at Juaboso Nkwanta, November 2019).
These conflicts with successors are common, 
especially where the deceased has not transferred 
ownership or shared his farms before dying. Hence 
many prefer to pass their land on to heirs as gifts, using 
traditional ceremonies to legitimise transfers, to avert 
abuse by successors.
3.2.2 Cocoa land gifted to family members
Related to inheritance were cocoa lands gifted by 
parents and grandparents to spouses and offspring. 
When women helped their husbands to establish 
cocoa farms their husbands could reward their efforts 
by gifting them a portion of their cocoa estates. This 
practice has been described by Hill (1963) but seems 
to be rising in popularity with widespread acceptance 
by local traditions and norms supported by laws. A 
52-year-old lady asserted that:
‘As for the land from my husband, it was given 
to me as a gift in the presence of witnesses. 
I paid the traditional fee for the witnesses. We 
even made a document as further security so 
no one can challenge or take the farm when he 
or I die’.
(Female cocoa farmer from Abrokofe, November 
2019).
Similarly, another woman stated that:
‘The land belonged to my late husband so he 
gave it to me as a gift before he died. That land 
is an acre and a half in size and so the land and 
the cocoa on it belong to me now’.
(70-year-old female cocoa farmer from 
Abrokofe, November 2019).
To finalise such arrangements a thanksgiving rite is often 
performed with the approval of the family members, 
usually in the presence of witnesses to signify the land 
has been handed over to the beneficiary. Similar to 
inheritance, only individually owned lands can be gifted.
3.3.3. Sharecropping for land: Abunu system
Sharecropping used to be a major strategy used by 
migrants to access lands. Current sharecropping land 
can be fallow land, a dying cocoa farm or conversion of 
land from another crop such as oil palm to cocoa. One 
female farmer explained a typical situation that leads to 
abunu sharecropping:
‘It is a situation where the land is yet to be 
cultivated with cocoa because the landowner 
does not have the energy to undertake farming 
activities and so the tenant farmer starts the 
farm all by him/herself until it matures. In this 
situation the farm is divided in two between 
farmer and landowner’.
(Female focus group discussion, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
From focus group discussions, landowners typically 
give out lands to the tenant sharecropper to establish 
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the cocoa. In the first one to five years the tenant grows 
food crops such as cocoyam, plantain and maise in 
between the cocoa seedlings — food which is either 
consumed by the tenant alone or shared with the 
landowner. Once the cocoa starts fruiting, at between 
three and five years for the hybrid variety, the farm 
is divided into two, the landlord makes his preferred 
choice, an agreement document is prepared, and 
two or more witnesses and drinks including money 
are presented to seal the deal. The chief of Sefwi 
has decreed that all sharecropping arrangements 
should be 50 years. However, when the cocoa dies, 
the landowner reserves the right to take back the 
land or negotiate a new deal. Tenants need to keep 
cordial relationships with the landlord to avert early 
repossession of the land.
The agreement documents can be signed at different 
levels depending on the resources of the tenant farmer 
and the level of security desired. Hence, the landowner, 
community chief and Sefwi Overlord (Omahene) sign 
and finally the state registration system or court signs 
to seal the deal. In some cases, the documents are 
prepared only after the cocoa starts fruiting and not at 
the initial transaction.
Only 11 per cent of the 28 sharecropping arrangements 
reported in the household survey were documented. 
Female farmers were less likely to have documents 
covering their sharecropping arrangements, although 
this gender difference was not significant
3.3.4. Purchased cocoa lands and farms.
Our in-depth interviews showed that lands for cocoa 
farming can be bought by interested individuals from 
chiefs, clan heads, family heads and individuals. 
A price is agreed, and documentation involving 
surveyors, chiefs and the courts are drawn up. About 
80 per cent of males and 86 per cent of females who 
purchased land had documents to cover the purchase: 
an improvement over the situation several years ago 
whereby land purchases were largely covered by 
verbal agreements. The prices of land are not fixed. 
People sell lands when they are mostly in need or are 
having trouble maintaining a diseased farm. Prices for 
land depend on the landowner, reasons for sale and 
the demand from competing uses, especially small-
scale mining. Miners are often willing to pay higher 
prices than farmers for land. According to the chief 
of Juaboso Nkwanta, two decades ago chiefs still 
had some secondary forest which they could sell to 
migrants, but these are no longer available.
Land sales are less common than they were. Many 
interviewees reported owning land bought for them by 
their grandmothers, grandfathers and parents. Fewer 
people are now willing to sell cocoa lands since they 
want to protect them for their progeny. One elderly 
interviewee indicated that during the 1980s cocoa farms 
were traded more easily than now, which he attributed 
to the economic conditions of the time and the value 
people assign to cocoa farms today as property.
Land purchase was seen by many as the most secure 
tenure because it is mostly backed by legal documents 
(see Table 3.3), sealed by traditional rites, and 
recognised by different stakeholders such as chiefs, 
family heads, and the state.
Parents often invested in their children by buying cocoa 
farms for them. For example, one couple in Juaboso 
Nkwanta purchased a four-acre [1.62ha] cocoa farm 
for their son. Another female interviewee spoke about 
investing in land for her son:
‘I even bought a land at Bono 10 years ago so he 
(son) can start a farm there, but he declined…I 
tried to convince him a couple of times but he 
declined. Later on, he changed his mind….he 
was a driver, he bought the car….sold it and we 
bought a cocoa farm that was already prepared 
for GH₵1,500 [US$250 at current rates]’.
(Life history: Elderly woman at Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
She subsequently convinced her husband to buy 
more land for the children since she was never gifted 
land from her husband or benefited much from his 
cocoa farms. Her story mirrors other parents’ stories, 
especially grandparents who want to establish their 
beloved grandchildren in cocoa.
Table 3.3 The proportion of land sales with documents by gender for Juaboso
Male Female Total
Document available 19 (79.2%) 6 (85.7%) 25 (80.65%)
No document 5 (20.8%) 1 (14.3%) 6 (19.35%)
Total 24 (100%) 7 (100%) 31 (100%)
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1488 Pr = 0.700
Cases observed in household survey, with shares of total in brackets. 
Source: Authors’ own, survey data 2019
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Compared to the past, lands are now purchased from 
individuals rather than chiefs. About 93.6 per cent of 
those who purchased lands reportedly bought them 
from individuals while just 6.4 per cent bought their 
lands from the chiefs. However, it is chiefs and rich 
cocoa farmers who have more ‘individual’ lands to give 
out or sell.
Land sales occur when poor families sell small parcels 
of land with dying cocoa they cannot maintain; when big 
landowners who are old cannot maintain their farms; 
when families need money to diversify their income 
portfolios or educate children (especially at tertiary 
level) or undertake a major investment; and when, 
family heads, in consultation with members, decide to 
sell part of the family land to meet a family contingency.
A rich sub-chief in Juaboso Nkwanta described how 
he sold his smaller parcels of cocoa that were in other 
surrounding communities because old age prevented 
him from managing the full 77 acres [31ha] he owned. 
Many large landowners have cocoa farms dotted in 
several places. These landowners, depending on their 
wealth, may sell smaller and less productive cocoa 
farms while keeping productive and larger ones.
Sales of cocoa farms therefore occur both out of 
necessity and choice representing dropping out of 
cocoa farming or accumulating cash income for other 
activities as in stepping out. Dropping out of cocoa 
farming involves a diversification away from cocoa. 
Poorer farmers dropping off is out of necessity due to 
disease, poor yields or other desperate sales, while for 
richer farmers the identification of better investment 
opportunities may lead to this.
3.3.5. Land insecurity
Land tenure insecurities are not new in Sefwi as farmers, 
both indigenes and migrants, face different insecurities 
in land relations with patrons. Some migrants’ lands 
were threatened by reinterpretations of cultivation 
rights forcing many to seek re-documentation from 
higher chiefs involving more cost. The length of tenure, 
initially in perpetuity provided annual rents were paid 
(Boni, 2005), is being cut especially on land acquired 
through sharecropping. The introduction of the Sefwi 
customary land secretariat in the 2000s has also come 
with newer rules, seeking to exact higher rents, reduce 
tenure periods and even change age-old contracts.
Also, increasing tensions between families seeking 
to interpret generational transmission of lands using 
matrilineal and patrilineal or family versus individual 
systems are rife. Land grants to wives, children and 
nephews and nieces have always been contested and 
resisted by families and matrilineal successors (Bukh, 
1979; Grier, 1992).
These tendencies are exacerbated under current 
conditions of customary land management powers 
granted to chiefs and the resort to modern interpretations 
of inheritance rather than traditional ones.
3.3.6. Changes and continuities in land relations
In sum, the results of the study indicate the following 
changes in land relations: 
i. emergence of serious land scarcities; 
ii. inheritance as a major means of land access 
increasingly from parents to children, posing 
significant challenges to matrilineal systems; 
iii. increasing security of land rights for wives and 
children; 
iv. sharecropping not being as common as before 
but a route used by both indigenes and migrants 
thereby posing stiff competition to migrants; 
v. documentation of land transactions being much 
more common today than in the past when 
witnesses were enough to seal deals; 
vi. the operation of customary land secretariats, 
especially in the Sefwi kingdom, which have 
formalised transactions which may make them 
easier to deal with in court compared to the 
protracted court cases of the past; 
vii. sharing of family lands and their subsequent 
conversion into individualised property; 
viii. land fragmentation with unviable farm sizes among 
poor family members; 
ix. and land prices defined mainly by competing 
interests such as mining and rubber plantations.
The landscape of cocoa farms still maintains the 1970 
social structure of big landowners of cocoa farms who 
are mostly chiefs and early land grabbers from the 
1950s to the 1970s, while later entrants into cocoa and 
commoners mostly own small, fragmented parcels of 
land. Wealth accumulation still mainly hinges on this 
historical advantage as large farms benefit more from 
state support, have capital to invest in intensification 
measures and can diversify into more lucrative 
economic activities. The spread of cocoa has had 
impactful major social and economic change with 
changes in the conception of the value of land, and 
new forms of land ownership (Sutton, 1983).
3.3.7 Efficiency and equity in land distribution
In relation to the efficiency of land distribution and 
whether cocoa lands were used productively, the 
results of the survey showed that some cocoa plots 
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were unproductive — defined as plots yielding less 
than 312kg/ha. Out of 560 plots, 210 (38 per cent) were 
yielding less than 312kg/ha (Figure 3.3).
Unproductive plots tended to be larger plots (Figure 
3.4). Plot size was inversely related to yield, although 
weakly so, with a correlation coefficient of -0.23.
Plots had become unproductive because farmers did 
not have the labour to cultivate their cocoa groves. This 
was typically the case for elderly farmers who could 
no longer themselves work on the farm and whose 
children had long left home. Unable or unwilling to hire 
labour, they let their cocoa groves go fallow, growing 
some food crops among the untended trees. Some of 
these unproductive plots were, moreover, old groves 
that needed replanting. Most common were plots 
that were hit hard by the ravages of black pod and 
insects, or were too weedy, or infested by mistletoe. 
Low productivity stemmed largely from lack of labour, 
lack of working capital or both. Farmers with low yields 
knew they could do better and knew how to better 
tend their trees, but they did not have the ready cash to 
hire labour or to buy inputs, such as sprays needed to 
control insects and black pod, when they were needed.
Reports of lack of labour to farm was surprising. It was 
usually possible for farmers lacking working capital to 
hire labour gangs and pay them after the harvest was 
sold and they had the cash to pay. It was not clear just 
why aging farmers, unable to work and whose children 
were not present to help, would not contract labour 
to be paid later. This question was not posed directly 
in the interviews, but some interviewees seemed 
dismayed by attacks by crop pests and diseases and 
perhaps did not think it worth paying for labour when 
the effort was likely to produce only meagre returns.
Lack of working capital to buy inputs was more 
understandable. Farmers had limited income and 
often faced pressing demands for scarce funds to pay 
school fees and meet medical bills.
In relation to land access, the Gini coefficient of 
equality of land access of 0.56 was high, however, 
land was not being monopolised. Some farmers had 
more land than others, but Sefwi is not dominated 
by monopolising landlords who can demand rents 
from people wanting to farm. Nor is Sefwi inhabited 
by landless rural households. Some have more land 
than others because their family was present when 
the forests were handed out to farm. These families 
received large allocations. Thus it seems that these 
large farmers have land due to historical circumstance, 
rather than through taking over others’ land. Indeed, the 
life histories of elders in Sefwi tended to be ones where 
a generation ago, the interviewee had more land than 
they had in 2019. Their lands had been passed down 
to offspring, or divided among multiple wives, or sold to 
pay debts. No histories of progressively accumulating 
large expanses of productive land were heard. Those 
who had increased their holdings through time, had 
started from having little or no land, so that their current 
holding was modest. We did not come across landlords 
who were renting or sharecropping out large areas — 
say, more than 20 acres [8ha] — and living off the rents.
Social tension over land was focused not on some 
people having more than others, but on inheritance. 
Land disputes, of which relatively few were recorded 
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in the interviews, were usually the result of a division of 
land among the offspring of a deceased male owner 
that left someone aggrieved that they had not got their 
rightful share. Land disputes were also commonly 
related to widows who had lost land to the extended 
family when the husband died.
At a lower level of discontent, youth were disgruntled 
that there was little land to inherit and that their 
parents were not giving them land — a complaint that 
was particularly heartfelt when the parent had passed 
their land to a caretaker to farm, rather than their 
son or daughter. Youth grievances were somewhat 
diluted, since it was clear, by word and deed, that 
many did not wish to become farmers. They were 
not studying in tertiary colleges and universities, 
taking up apprenticeships, or joining with friends to 
buy a taxi, to become farmers. On the contrary, their 
dreams were urban.
22 Working Paper 073 | November 2021
4.1 Changing labour relations in cocoa 
production in Ghana
Cocoa production requires plenty of labour to manage 
groves well. Cocoa production ideally requires about 
four weedings per year, removal of mistletoes and 
other epiphytes, shade management through pruning 
and removal of basal suckers, application of fertiliser, 
spraying against pests and disease, and harvesting, 
opening the pods, fermenting and drying the beans 
(Dormon et al., 2007) ( see also Box 4.1). Annual 
requirements per hectare of established trees have 
been estimated at 136 days (Bray, 1959), 105 days 
(Urquhart, 1961), and 109 days (Beckett, 1944).
Mobilising this labour has long been intricately related 
to land access, family relations and scale of production. 
The earliest cocoa farmers depended upon family 
labour, with spouses and other members seeing their 
labour as investment in common property (Okali, 1974; 
Duncan, 2010). When large cocoa farms were planted 
in Akim Abuakwa, more labour was needed (Hill, 1963). 
Some was recruited from the extended family, with land 
distributed to family members in exchange for labour 
(Hill, 1959). Some labour was hired from migrants from 
the Volta area, northern Ghana and Sahelian countries.
By 1910, labour was hired in four ways. One, annual 
labourers who were paid at the end of the year — 
although this was in decline owing to some farmers 
not paying up. Two, abusa caretakers rewarded by a 
third of the crop for taking care of the farm, including 
pruning, weeding it, and harvesting the cocoa. Both 
groups also enjoyed grants of food crop land to feed 
themselves and their families. Three, nkotokoano 
whereby a labourer-harvester was paid a fixed sum 
for every bag of cocoa harvested. Four, casual labour 
engaged to perform varied tasks, paid by day or task 
(Hill, 1963).
These varying forms accommodated farmers’ cash 
flow: whether hiring farmers had cash to pay labour 
4 LABOUR ON COCOA FARMS IN SEFWI
Box 4.1 Cocoa’s labour requirementst
‘When one acquires a land for cocoa, you need to cut trees, clear undergrowth, and burn it. After which 
you plant cocoyam, plantain and other food crops which is then intercropped with the cocoa seedlings 
to provide shade. These crops grow together for three years requiring frequent weeding and other 
agronomic practices if the cocoa is hybrid, or for five years if it’s an older hybrid and Amazonia variety. 
Benefits are derived from food crops for feeding or sale depending on quantum of harvest.
Without a thorough regime of weeding the farm at least four times annually the cocoa will not grow well. 
After, husbands, with or without the help of labourers, clear the forest land, their wives normally plant 
the food crops while the men plant the cocoa. They make boundaries on the farm if he has two wives 
because he needs to show where each wife and her children will control.
When the trees grow, we need to prune, spray and weed under them. During the harvest, which is 
normally the major and the minor season, you need harvesters, carriers, breakers and dryers. These can 
be done using a combination of labour from family, casual by-day labour, abusa caretaker, annual labour 
caretaker, abunu sharecropper, and labour parties or groups’. 
[Focus group meeting with men in Juaboso Nkwanta]
Labour needs vary through time. Planting and establishing a farm require a lot of labour, while maintaining 
productive trees requires less labour. When cocoa dies or becomes diseased, labour demands increase 
again to remove the dead or diseased trees and replant. Over the past ten years cocoa production in the 
Juaboso municipal has come under attack by diseases leading to declining productivity and the need to 
replant farms, with sporadic and little state support.
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there and then or needed to await harvest before they 
could pay.
Over time the importance of different forms of labour 
has changed. Use of labour from the nuclear and 
extended family has declined, largely because as land 
has become less abundant farmers have not been 
able to reward their family helpers by granting them 
land. Lineage reciprocity and solidarity has been 
undermined by dwindling spare land (Amanor, 2005). 
Most recently, child labour has been lost to schooling 
and labour laws restricting use of children.
Annual contracts and share contracts have become 
less attractive because once cocoa groves are well 
established with a full canopy, food crops cannot 
be grown among the cocoa for lack of light (Sutton, 
1983). Hence, casual labour has become increasingly 
important (Sutton, 1983)
4.2 Labour forms and dynamics in 
cocoa farms in Juaboso Municipal
The results show that farms in Sefwi are worked by a 
combination of household and hired labour (Table 4.1).)
Most of the time, cocoa farmers in Juaboso work alone 
on their farms or with their spouses (Table 4.2). Regular 
hired help comes from sharecroppers, employed by 
just under a fifth of farmers.
Regular labour is supplemented by additional hands 
for arduous tasks, such as weeding, and for peak 
seasons such as the harvest.
In the past, labour was likely to come from the family or 
from migrants hired on year-long contracts. However, 
these arrangements are giving way to hiring labour for 
specific tasks:
‘In the past we worked on the farms with our 
wives and children. But now labourers are 
gradually replacing or complementing family 
labour. We have by-day workers and some 
labourers who work per acre and they are 
paid accordingly. Other farmers hire labourers 
who work on the land for a year and they 
are paid a fixed rate and provided with some 
other welfare arrangements. Those who work 
for a year as if they belong to your household 
(adopted labourers) are fully catered for in terms 
of feeding, health, inputs, accommodation etc. 
but they still receive a payment at the end of 
the year as agreed. Many of these labourers are 
young migrant men and children, mostly from 
the north. This arrangement was in existence 
before this community was established, but 
Table 4.1: Forms of labour in Sefwi
Form Tasks Payment and conditions
Farmer’s own labour All None
Household labour from 
spouse, offspring
All, but women may not cut parasites 
from trees or harvest pods because 
this is seen as dangerous or male 
work.
None, but with promises to transfer land in the 
future; or pocket money.
Exchange labour — 
groups within community 
who know and trust one 
another
Typically for laborious work, especially 
breaking pods.
Obligation to join in with group as it goes around 
members’ farms.
Hired by day — may be 
locals or migrants
Typically hired for laborious tasks: 
weeding, harvesting, breaking pods.
Task rates usually offered when the 
job needs doing promptly.
Set local rate paid, typically GH₵25 [US$4.2] a day. 
May be a premium for harvesting. 
Hired by task — most 
likely to be migrants
Paid by measured area, e.g. GH₵ 100 [US$17] to 
weed an acre [0.4ha].
Work carried out by gangs. Migrants from the north, 
Volta and Togo commonly work in groups.
Payments may be deferred until after beans have 
been sold.
Hired: caretakers — 
typically young migrants 
from the north
All Paid an annual fee. The caretaker is also given land 
to grow food, accommodation, and medical bills are 
paid.
Hired: caretakers — may 
be migrants or locals
Paid one third of the value of cocoa at the end of the 
season.
Source: Authors’ own
24 Working Paper 073 | November 2021
it is becoming difficult to find such labourers 
compared to the past’.
(Focus group participant -Juaboso Nkwanta)
The increasing importance of wage labour is a 
continuation of the process began in the 1920s as 
described by Hill (1963) and Sutton (1983). Social 
modernisation and economic liberalisation have 
played important roles in influencing these changes 
(Amanor, 2005).
4.2.1 Family labour
Household labour, available to almost all farmers in 
Juaboso, comes from farmers and their immediate 
relations – usually the nuclear family but can include 
others domiciled with them. Men were engaged in 
all stages of cocoa establishment and maintenance, 
while activities such as weeding, growing food crops 
and carrying and breaking cocoa pods were reserved 
for women. When children helped on cocoa farms, 
they gathered pods, weeded and helped transplant 
nursed seedlings.
Most male farmers with farms in different communities 
or even in the same community shared their lands 
among their wives. The wives managed the farms, 
supported by their husbands in tasks perceived as 
men’s work. Men often established the farm before 
handing over to wives. The proceeds or income went 
to the husband who then provided the material needs 
of the wife and her children. Cocoa income was mainly 
in men’s hands except where farms explicitly belonged 
to wives.
For new farms, household labour was used to begin 
cocoa farming as few farmers had the income to hire 
labourers:
‘I did not have any capital to start with, so I 
relied on my own physical strength to undertake 
all the activities on the land’.
(Female cocoa farmer, 52 years, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
The interviewee began with an acre [0.4ha] of cocoa, 
then gradually expanded to six acres in different plots 
over time. Subsequent farms were more likely to be 
worked with some hired labour than the first farms.
Mobilising relatives as labour was important for poorer 
small farmers in dealing with high cost of labour when 
cash is scarce.
‘I do not usually hire labour because most of 
the time, my siblings and even my mother help 
in undertaking activities on the farm. It is only 
when I am going to weed that I usually hire 
about two labourers’.
(Interview, 27-year male cocoa farmer from 
Abrokofe, November 2019).
A male farmer at Juaboso Nkwanta with young 
children, who planted his first cocoa farm in 1992 and 
now has four farms totalling eight acres [3.2ha] states:
‘I don’t have money to hire them (labour) so I 
do the work myself. I do the work with my wife 
because my children are too young to assist. I 
hire labourers when I have some money but it 
is rare’.
(Male farmer, 49 years, Juaboso Nkwanta).
The extended family did not seem to contribute much 
labour. This may be because cocoa is sold, rather than 
kept as a communal commodity. The exception are 
family members outside the nuclear family who are 







With other relative 2.9
With sharecropper 18.8
With annual sharecropper 3.3
Source: Authors’ own, survey data 2019
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maintained by the household head, who can then ask 
them to work in return for their upkeep.
Once cocoa trees bore fruit and generated funds, 
farmers typically hired additional labour, depending on 
family labour availability and the tasks at hand:
‘Basically, it is myself and my wife who maintain 
the farm but when we find that the work is too 
much then we hire labourers’.
(47-year-old male cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
Uses of family labour is declining. Family labour is not 
guaranteed as social modernisation and monetisation 
of social relations has led to some family members 
dropping out of the family’s pool of labour. Most farmers 
are losing family labour, especially that of children owing 
to education and child labour laws. Children are more 
likely to be enrolled in school, other vocational training, 
or apprenticeships to acquire certificates, skills and 
competences needed to diversify from farming.
‘One of my children is a tailor in the village, 
another works in Juaboso hospital as an 
accountant, another runs a shop at Nkwanta, 
another is also a tailor at Kroso… there is only 
one child that stays with me in this town, but not 
in my household. The last is in Accra learning a 
trade so I do not stay with them’.
(52-year-old female cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
Most children of cocoa farmers are moving into other 
livelihoods rather than cocoa farming alone, leading to 
the use of hired and caretaker labour.
In their absence, the farm is worked by their parents, 
caretakers or hired labourers.
‘My children do not go to the farm regularly 
due to their education; they only go to the farm 
when they come home on vacation’.
(Interview with 52-year-old female cocoa farmer 
from Abrokofe, November 2019).
Increasingly, youth are not working on their parents’ 
farms. They accused some parents of refusing to give 
them cocoa farms, instead preferring strangers as 
caretakers:
F4: Some parents are so old and cannot even 
work on the farm but they will give it to someone 
else as a caretaker and not us. They will not give 
it to their children but rather a total stranger will 
get the farm as a caretaker.
F1: That is true. Some of the parents will say 
that their children will not take good care of the 
farm, or they will take all the proceeds and not 
give some of it to their parents. And that is why 
most of the parents prefer to give it to someone 
else other than their children.
M4: We will not accompany (=work) them (our 
parents) to the farm again because they don’t 
give us some of the income generated from the 
cocoa.
M1: It is because of our attitude towards them. 
We are all in need of money. I am sure if I get 
money, I will certainly buy all the fashionable 
clothes and I think the same goes for the 
women. So, the parents know of this and for 
that reason they will give the land to a caretaker 
who will manage it and give him his share of the 
proceeds which will be more than his children 
will give to him.
(Participants in mixed youth focus group, 
Juaboso Nkwanta)
Distrust within some families breaks down the age-
old use of family labour on cocoa farms where all 
members benefit from the proceeds of the farm. This 
has caused conflict when the youth are not happy with 
migrant labour taking up their jobs and making them 
strangers in their own families. The involvement of 
some sons on their fathers’ and mothers’ cocoa farms 
is minimal. Given that most children go to school until 
junior high when most drop out, attachment to the 
farm diminishes which may cause parents to doubt the 
ability of their children to manage their farms. Migrants, 
on the other hand, have often spent most of their lives 
on cocoa, accumulating a wealth of experience and 
skills. They may be more trustworthy because they are 
afraid to misbehave which could lead to abrogation of 
their contracts. On the other hand, not all caretakers 
are trustworthy:
F4: Sometimes the caretakers will steal some 
of the cocoa and hide it somewhere. Your 
father will not even believe you if you should 
report it to him. He will tag you as jealous. He 
will only believe it when he sees it with his own 
two eyes. So, the relationship between the 
caretaker and the farmer is sometimes not 
cordial. But there are others that are cordial 
and that is because the caretaker is honest 
and loyal to the farmer.
(Participant in youth focus group, Juaboso 
Nkwanta)
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4.2.2 Labour groups
Farmers may combine to work jointly on each other’s 
farms in rotation. These labour groups or associations 
seem to be dying, other than among caretakers 
for harvesting and breaking pods. Many farmers 
interviewed saw groups to be increasingly ineffective:
‘Those groups are not as effective as they used 
to be some time ago; it could get to your turn 
and you will struggle to get people to crush your 
cocoa pods’.
(52-year-old female cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019)
While mutual labour groups are on the decline, 
they are still part of harvest groups because this 
task requires more people. Group members are 
mainly friends or farm neighbours who come 
together to break pods for a member against 
the promise of that member reciprocating. 
When asked if he uses this type of labour for 
breaking his pods, a 49-year-old male farmer in 
Juaboso responded, “We do that by groups so 
you should be a member of a group. Once you 
are a member they will come and assist”.
However, other farmers argued that due to the 
insincerity of people these days they preferred to hire 
labour paid in cash and food.
The commodification of labour and especially family 
labour accounts for the weakening moral economy 
of self-help. For some they prefer not to have the 
obligation to the group. The availability of capital to 
pay for hired labour also explains the declining interest 
in group labour. The most frequent reason given was 
that group members reneged on their responsibilities 
and obligations, creating mistrust and a sense of 
being cheated.
4.2.3 Hired labour
Hired labour covered shortfalls in household labour 
especially on large farms. Farmers’ children only helped 
when they were strong enough and on holidays from 
school, giving a small window of time. Spouses who 
worked other jobs and were unable to dedicate their 
time to family farms resorted to the use of hired labour.
‘When I have to spray and harvest while my 
husband is not around, I hire labourers to do 
these jobs. I sometimes also need to weed 
and because the farms are big, I have to take 
labourers. I invest a lot in labour’.
(Elderly female cocoa farmer from Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
Most small farmers relied solely on family labour:
‘No, I have never hired labourers to work on my 
farm. The reason is that my farm size is relatively 
smaller compared to others. Another reason 
why I don’t prefer hiring labourers is that hired 
labourers usually do not work to satisfaction. 
Often times, we see farmers or farm owners 
Table 4.4: Use of hired labour: the number of famers hiring for specific tasks
Day contract labour hired: Male Female
Weeding 101 (59%) 68 (65%)
Harvesting 84 (49%) 52 (50%)
Pruning 66 (38%) 46 (44%)
Land clearance 22 (13%) 20 (19%)
Source: Authors’ own
Table 4.3: Proportion of respondents who worked for others for more than 10 days in last 12 
months
Male Female Total
Farm labour 26 (15%) 8 (7.7%) 33 (12%)
Casual employment, not on farms 22 (13%) 16 (15%) 37 (14%)
Formal employment 10 (5.8%) 2 (1.9%) 11 (4.3%)
Skilled worker: Mason, Carpenter, Mechanic, etc. 33 (19%) 16 (15%) 48 (18%)
Running business, such as a shop 38 (22%) 40 (38.5%) 76 (28%)
Source: Authors’ own
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engaged in fights with labourers they hired to 
work on their farms because the labourers did 
not work to the satisfaction of the farm owners’.
(40-year-old male cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
Hiring of labourers has over time become important 
for all categories of farmers. Labourers are generally 
available once the farmer can pay. At peak times, 
even hired labour may run short. Social relations built 
over time then determines who gets labour first. Kind 
farmers who provide other incentives beside the wage 
usually have a dedicated labour crew to choose from.
Labourers may be indigenes, Togolese or northerners. 
Most indigene small farmers hired out their labour for 
funds to invest in their own farms and meet other bills 
since their farms did not generate enough to meeting 
living costs. Table 4.3 presents the results of the 
household survey on the proportion of respondents 
who worked for others for more than 10 days in the last 
12 months. Providing labour on other people’s farms 
was an alternative livelihood for a few farmers, mainly 
male (Table 4.3). About 15 per cent of male and 7.7 
per cent of female farmers reported working on other 
people’s farms for more than 10 days in 12 months 
prior to the study. Most indigenes hiring out their labour 
were youth without cocoa farms, especially those left 
out of family inheritance (see section 3.2.1).
The household survey also showed that farmers hired 
labourers for arduous and time-consuming tasks, 
especially weeding, harvesting and pruning (Table 4.4). 
Almost all plots were worked in part by hired labour for 
one or other task, but the median amount of hired labour 
was low: 4.5 days per acre or 11 days per hectare.
Availability of labour
Although labour can still be hired in all three communities, 
as long as the farmer can pay, the number of labourers 
is declining. For example, one interviewee stated that 
‘labourers were quite readily available 10 years ago 
compared to now. These days the labourers are not 
as much as they were 10 years ago’ (27-year-old male 
cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, November 2019).
The emergence of (illegal) small-scale mining 
(galamsey) in cocoa communities was one reason for 
less labour:
‘People would rather engage in galamsey than 
become a farm labourer because the galamsey 
business is known to pay more than the farm 
labour. In a day, a galamsey labourer could earn 
a minimum of GH₵50 [US$8.3] while a farm 
labourer earns a maximum of GH₵30 (5$)’.
(27-year-old male cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
‘It is difficult to access labour because of the 
galamsey operations. Most of the people have 
stopped the cocoa caretaker job. The same 
applies to labourers. You see these young 
men returning home (pointing to men walking 
towards us) went for galamsey. They earn about 
GH₵100 [US$17] a day, so they will not go to 
work as a labourer in your farm just to earn 
GH₵25 [US$4.2] or GH₵30 [US$5]’.
(42-year-old male cocoa farmer from Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
Fewer migrants come to work in Sefwi today than 
before, although enough come from the north, Volta 
and Togo for peak season tasks such as weeding and 
harvesting. Migrants often come in groups, so they 
can carry out contracted work rapidly and also for 
company and solidarity. They lead hard lives, basing 
themselves in one or two other places, then coming to 
Sefwi for peak seasons. They have to cover costs for 
travel and accommodation themselves.
Forms of hiring
Forms of hiring included hiring by day or by piece 
rate. One 42-year-old day labourer described a typical 
workday when paid by day, stating that ‘when you take 
by day work, you start from 7am and by 11 or 12 noon, 
you close. If you go and start work, once it is 12 noon 
you will close. The charge is GH₵25 [US$4.2]’ (Day 
labourer, 42 years, Juaboso Nkwanta).
By-day labour can be deployed for all tasks and at 
short notice. Farm wages rise with the price of cocoa, 
reflecting a fair wage. The day rate increased from 
GH₵20 [US$3.3] to GH₵25[US$4.2] per day in 2018. 
As one female cocoa farmer explained, ‘anytime there 
is an increment in prices of cocoa labourers also 
increase their charges. Maybe it was twenty (GH₵20 
[US$3.3]) but once there is an increment, they will also 
increase it to about GH₵25 [US$4.2]’ (Female cocoa 
farmer, Abrokofe, November 2019).Harvesters are 
paid more for their skill and because it is considered 
hard work, while all other tasks ranging from carriers 
to pod breakers receive the same amount of GH₵25 
[US$4.2] a day.
Other factors can increase wages such as labour 
shortages, diversion to other crops and small-scale 
mining, while arriving migrants relieve shortages.
Bargaining for a lower price only happens for food 
crops, but not cocoa which is a commercial crop with a 
guaranteed price. Commercial crops with higher prices 
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tend to guarantee better wages for labourers than food 
crops with unpredictable prices in local markets.
Farmers also provide food to labourers to incentivise 
them to perform at their best. Where the farmer has no 
time to cook, they provide a top-up for the labourer to 
buy food.
Labour may also be hired on piece rates, or Adopaa, 
where a specific amount is paid for a measured task, 
such as GH₵100 [US$17] per acre [0.4ha] of weeding 
or pruning. Tasks such as weeding and spraying are 
typically contracted out on piece rates. This may be 
paid there and then or can be on credit, to be paid after 
the cocoa beans are sold. Those prepared to work on 
credit come from outside the community, and charge 
more as some interest is factored in. This suits farmers 
who lack cash:
‘Yes, we have resident labourers in the 
community and then there are those who come 
from other places like Togo as well. We have 
some labourers who offer their services on 
credit. They agree with the farmer to do what 
is required of them on the farm and then during 
the harvesting season they come back for their 
payment’.
(30-year-old male cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019)
According to interviews with farmers, this category of 
labourers is made up mostly of migrants from Togo:
“I go for the long-term labourer (adopaa) 
because you can engage their services on 
credit. As for the by-day [labourers]… you have 
to pay them at the end of the day but the long 
term labourer will take the money after you 
harvest and they weed, cut mistletoe and do 
other things you require of them’.
(52-year-old male cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
“They [labourers from Togo] come in groups 
of about five. When you hire them like that 
the work moves faster so if you want it done 
quickly, you go for them. You are responsible for 
their food and accommodation because they 
are strangers. So, you can agree to give them 
a certain amount of money for food so they are 
able to do the work or that they can take some 
food crops from the farm to feed themselves’.
(52-year-old cocoa farmer, Gyasehene, 
Abrokofe, November 2019).
Deferring pay involves trust. Migrants may weed in 
March to May, then return to the community after 
harvesting in October to get their money.
‘Usually when these labourers come, they work 
on multiple farms and write the names of the 
farmers and amount owed them down. So, 
when it is harvesting time, they come back 
to the communities and go to these famers 
to collect their monies. Usually, they measure 
the farm by acre and charge you. If they are 
weeding the cocoa farm, they charge about 
GH₵100 [US$17] per acre. When the farm is 
maybe a food crops farm, they may charge 
between GH₵50 [US$8.3] to GH₵80 [US$13.3]. 
Sometimes you can negotiate with them and 
they will take GH₵50 [US$8.3] for weeding the 
food farm. When the harvesting season is in, 
they then come for their money. Even yesterday 
we made a public announcement that those 
who came to do the credit labour are back to 
the community so those who owe them should 
pay them.’
 (Male focus group, Antobia, 2019).
Unfortunately, this trust is not always honoured. 
Participants in focus groups bemoaned the behaviour 
of some farmers who did not pay labourers as 
promised. This can be a headache for migrants.
‘Yes, and there is this woman and she wants to 
play smart but she is not smart. We came to do 
the work and when we checked the size of the 
farm, it was four acres [1.6ha] and a little more. 
She has not settled anything at all; the GH₵400 
[US$67] she is supposed to pay us – when we 
go to her, she says “tomorrow” …The other day 
we went to see her, she shouted all of a sudden 
and said, “I have GH₵100 [US$17], how much 
money is left?”. My father took that money and I 
told him to give the money back to her because 
she is saying she doesn’t know us. He should 
give her GH₵100 [US$17] back to her; I don’t 
want to take it … This morning, I went to see 
her, she said that we should follow her to the 
farm to go and check the size of it. For another 
person, his total debt is GH₵880 [US$147]. I 
went to see him in the morning, and he said he 
is going to harvest cocoa and come…Another 
person owing GH₵450 [US$75] also said he is 
going to harvest cocoa and come. For the rest, 
I haven’t seen them yet. That is the issue’.
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(Interview with a 53-year-old migrant from 
Togo)6 
Migrants have little power when a farmer reneges. If 
they complain to the police, they must pay them to 
come to intervene. Leaders and elders encourage 
farmers to pay up, but they can only try to persuade 
farmers to act honestly.
4.2.4 Caretaker labour
Instead of hiring by the day or task, farmers may contract 
caretakers to carry out most of the farming. Situations 
where they might do so include where the farmer is old, 
too ill to work, or simply has lands that are too large to 
manage alone. The results of the study showed that this 
practice is not common with caretakers only employed 
on 14 per cent of the plots surveyed.
Caretaker labourers stayed within the community either 
temporary or permanently, unlike migrant labourers 
who circulated.
Two caretaker systems operate in Juaboso. The first 
form of caretakers are annual labourers, young men 
mostly from the north who join the farmer’s household 
to take care of the farm. If they live with the farmer, 
they may also perform household tasks. A contract is 
normally agreed, stating the amount to be paid at the 
end of the year irrespective of cocoa output, plus the 
responsibilities of the farmer to feed, house and meet 
medical care, etc. Agents who supply these labourers 
from the north are mostly family members such as 
uncles and brothers who usually receive a payment 
on behalf of the family. Some focus group informants 
believed that caretakers were being cheated both by 
the farmer and their agents or families. It was possible 
to have older, indigenous caretakers but focus groups 
reported that they were not common.
The second type of caretakers, well documented in the 
literature, receive a third of harvest for their services. 
These are called the abusa labourer but they are not the 
same as the abusa tenant. They have no entitlement to 
land but merely work for a share of the crop. Since 
their rewards are linked to crop yields, they have an 
incentive to take good care of the farm. They work 
under an arrangement agreed upon by both parties:
‘We have the caretaker labourer, like what I am 
practising. What happens is that in caretaking, 
which we call “Abusa”, the owner plants the land 
and gives it to someone to maintain (weeding, 
cutting of mistletoe, etc). The owner is also 
responsible for buying chemicals for spraying 
6 For the migrant in question, the problem was unexpected and unwelcome. The subject took up much  
 of the interview. The migrant was clearly at his wit’s end.
and fertilisers. Then when you harvest, you 
divide the produce into three parts, the owner 
takes two and the caretaker takes one’.
(42-year-old male cocoa farmer, Abrokofe, 
November 2019).
This arrangement is universal across all communities 
as stated by another female farmer:
’The arrangement is that I buy the chemicals, 
pay for labour and buy fuel for spraying while 
he maintains the farm by weeding, cutting 
mistletoe and general maintenance work. When 
it is time for harvest, we divide into three, I take 
two and he takes one’.
(Female farmer, Abrokofe, November 2019)
Some farmers even engage hired labour to help the 
caretaker when farms are large, or the task needs to be 
done swiftly. A 42-year-old male cocoa farmer spoke 
about the expectations of caretaker labourers:
‘Weeding three times a year, cutting of mistletoe 
2 times a year, if he knows how to spray and 
you have the machine then he will spray while 
the wife fetches the water. If he hires someone 
to do the spraying, then he will have to bear 
the cost. If the farm owner does not have the 
machine, then hiring the machine becomes the 
cost of the farm owner. But even if you have the 
machine and he doesn’t know how to operate it 
then you the farm owner can do the spraying to 
prevent the destruction of the machine’.
(Male cocoa farmer, 42 years, Abrokofe, Nov. 
2019).
Caretakers also have an association whose members 
help each other on a routine rotation. Thus, most of the 
work expected of them is done in groups. This lessens 
the need for caretakers to engage hired labourers to 
weed and perform other activities expected of them 
thus reducing costs. The story of Toledo in Box 3.2 
shows the circumstances of caretaker abusa labourers.
Environmental conditions, diseases, input use, cost 
of extra labour and the price of cocoa determine 
caretakers’ wages. The nature of the contract affects 
the welfare of caretakers positively or negatively. For 
instance, caretakers may be allowed to grow food 
crops both for subsistence and possible sale, they may 
get loans from farmers, and they may be treated as 
household members in meeting their basic needs — 
and not be taken advantage of through expulsion before 
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the cocoa harvest. On the other hand the caretaker 
may not have most of these privileges thereby making 
it a retrogressive contract.
Relations between caretakers and landowners are 
not coldly contractual, but social. Trust matters. 
Landowners run the risk that the caretaker takes the 
harvest, sells it, and disappears. For this reason, one 
caretaker told us that landlords were reluctant to allow 
unmarried young men to take care of their cocoa. 
Caretakers, on the other hand, run the risk that the 
landlord acts unfairly, perhaps telling them to leave 
before the harvest. On the other hand, both parties 
gain from close and cooperative relations. Caretakers 
turn to their landlords in emergencies, for example 
when they have medical bills.
4.3 Gender and labour
4.3.1 Gender norms and practice
Gender norms apply to working on cocoa farms 
with some tasks, requiring physical strength or being 
dangerous, seen as men’s work. Cutting mistletoe, for 
example, involves climbing and the risk of falling, while 
cocoa harvesting puts labourers at risk of pods falling 
on their heads.
In one female focus group discussion, women spoke 
about women’s roles on cocoa farms:
F8: The women plant the cocoa. Sometimes 
both the woman and the man clear or weed the 
farm. We also hire labourers to support. The 
woman plants the cocoa and the food crops.
F3: The woman only weeds around the trees 
but the man handles the rest.
F8: The woman cannot prune the tree. Some 
of the men do not even know how to do it so 
they go to the Department of Agriculture to get 
people to do it.
F2: Some women climb the trees to prune it but 
others are afraid that they might fall down from 
the tree.
(Female focus group discussion, Juaboso 
Nkwanta)
Norms were formed from the start of cocoa planting 
in Ghana. Women were assigned the tasks of carrying 
cocoa pods when hiring labourers during the harvest. 
Hill (1963) notes that women were often carriers, but 
never labourers for other tasks in the early days of 
cocoa in Ghana. However, over time, women’s roles 
have diversified into other forms of labour such as 
weeding and processing cocoa.
While these are the norms, practice often differs. 
On household cocoa farms not yet split or gifted to 
women, men weed, harvest and dry while women 
Box 4.2 Toledo the migrant caretaker from Bawku, Northern Ghana
Toledo (not his real name) is a 22-year-old migrant caretaker from Bawku in the Upper East Region with 
one wife and no children. He takes care of three farms totalling six acres [2.4ha]. He has been a cocoa 
farm caretaker for the past nine years since his teenage days. The last two towns he worked in were 
not remunerating as he considers years of serious struggle without any progress. He is happy with his 
location where he considers his relationship with farm owners as good and the yields as much better 
than his last two destinations.
His contract with the farm owner requires that the farm should not be weedy, pruning of parasitic plants 
like mistletoe (Nkranpan), harvesting cocoa pods and drying them, and preventing people from stealing 
cocoa. The farmer provides fertiliser and other chemicals, while he absorbs the cost of transporting 
cocoa beans home and labour for breaking cocoa pods. These are normally deducted before the sharing 
of proceeds from sales. As an abusa labourer, when cocoa is sold, the money is divided into three, the 
owner of the farm taking two shares while Toledo gets one. He has no written contract but a verbal one 
with two witnesses that follows laid down rules of abusa contracts in the Sefwi Wiawso Kingdom.
He is part of a labour group for harvesting cocoa, but all costs including feeding and entertaining the 
group is borne by him, however he can borrow money from the farmer to be deducted when beans are 
sold. A part of his payment for the third harvest in the year is kept by the farmer as a guarantee in case he 
abandons the farm. He is constantly working as the weeds grow quickly, leaving him with no rest at all.
He has fallen a couple of times, dislocating his shoulders and breaking one arm. The payment for his 
hard and risky work depends on the amount of cocoa harvested. He therefore has a vested interest in 
making sure all is done right to produce a good harvest.
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carry pods and beans. For male farmers with multiple 
farms and multiple wives, each wife is usually given a 
dedicated farm to work on. She carries out all activities, 
particularly weeding, while the husband rotates around 
the farms to cut mistletoe, apply chemicals, harvest 
pods and eventually sell the cocoa to buying agencies.
Establishing a cocoa farm, especially from secondary 
forest, is considered the most demanding phase in 
cocoa production. Most farmers who acquired lands 
while married admitted that they cleared the land with 
help from their spouses which presupposes women 
could and did carry out tasks described as male.
In the absence of men, women farmers may carry out 
male tasks. Women farmers rely mainly on their own 
labour and that of their children, with occasional use of 
hired labour. A few women admitted knowing how to 
harvest cocoa pods during the female focus groups, 
but most relied on male harvesters, or their husbands 
and grown children for harvesting. Over the years 
women have learned to engage in all aspects of work 
on cocoa farms, though their labour in some domains 
is not acknowledged. For example, in a female focus 
group discussion, one woman spoke about her 
knowledge of harvesting pods, stating, 
‘it is mostly males who do that work. I know 
how to harvest cocoa but they will not hire a 
woman to do it. They mostly prefer the men’.
The demand for female labour is very high during the 
harvest season. Similarly, men have also become cocoa 
pod carriers due to weeding tasks being unavailable 
during the harvest while the demand for carriers goes 
up. By-day labourers of both sexes take up these jobs 
thereby breaking age-old gender barriers.
It seems that some of the gender division in labour has 
broken down when people work on their own or family 
farms, with perhaps the exception of harvesting which 
is generally seen as a job for men.
4.3.2 Gender and the labour market
When it comes to the labour market, gender norms 
are reasserted. Women are offered ‘women’s jobs’, 
men are offered the ‘men’s jobs’ — and men are often 
paid better for these roles because they are seen to be 
arduous, skilled or dangerous.
Both men and women reported being paid the same 
for jobs such as carrying cocoa and breaking pods. 
However, some tasks dominated by men, such as 
harvesting cocoa, are paid higher. Those who harvest 
earn the highest wages because this is specialised 
work, involving more effort with the risk of being hit on 
the head by falling pods. The refusal to hire women on 
grounds of tradition and the excuse of protecting them 
from hazards deprives daring women of a good source 
of income.
Although many women join the wage labour pool for 
tasks such as weeding, there is still a preference for 
males. Weeding is considered tedious, so fewer women 
are hired to provide this service. However, women 
typically weed on their family farms while the men 
provide the service on the labour market for cash. One 
94-year-old male farmer who replanted eleven acres 
of his 22-acre [8.9ha] farm preferred hiring women, 
stating, ‘I have employed nine different women to work 
on my farms. I have shared the farms into portions for 
them and so each person works on their own portion’.
This farmer was once married to eight women who 
were caretakers of his farms but now has one wife after 
divorcing the rest, hence his appreciation of the work 
of women compared to men. There is growing respect 
for women’s ability to do cocoa jobs, even if most of 
the hiring is to carry pods.
Women hire labour less than men. Many women 
cannot hire labour for lack of cash due to having small 
farms and fewer opportunities to earn wages than 
men. Some women therefore rely on credit labour 
during mostly high labour demand seasons:
‘We do hire labour but because we don’t have 
enough money, we hire them on credit. They 
come to the farm to work maybe in the fifth 
month and they will come back in the eleventh 
month for their money. So, as I sit here, I am in 
debt and I need money to pay for that. The men 
are not there to support us anymore. Farming is 
tedious and we need support’.
(F8 speaking at a female focus group discussion 
in Juaboso Nkwanta, November 2019
Given the incentive to work for pay on the day, well-
capitalised men usually obtain labour before women, 
with multiple benefits of meeting deadlines for 
specific farm activities which are critical to obtaining 
higher yields. 
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Ever since cocoa has been grown in Ghana since the 
late nineteenth century, cocoa farming has depended 
very largely on getting land and finding the labour 
to cultivate it. Capital has been scarce but a lesser 
concern: cocoa has until recently usually not required 
heavy cash outlays on inputs. For the first one hundred 
years or so of cocoa in Ghana, the industry has 
developed by planting new lands — both to expand 
the total area and to replace older groves abandoned 
to swollen shoot. The main findings were as follows:
Gaining access to land was not difficult. For 
household offspring, there was the land worked by 
their parents and lineage elders that could be inherited. 
If division among offspring meant too little land, then 
land could usually be had by moving to the forest 
frontier. Chiefs would allocate land to incomers for 
nominal fees, so long as the farmers were prepared to 
plant up the land allocated.
Finding labour was the greater challenge. Family 
labour could be put to work, so long as there was 
the promise of inherited land to reward working for 
family elders. This could be supplemented by migrant 
labour, recruited from parts of Ghana and territories to 
the north, where population pressure was high upon 
semi-arid lands of low potential. For migrants, earnings 
from working in cocoa became a vital support to the 
livelihoods of the north of the country.
In the last 60 years, circumstances have changed 
in Sefwi. The land frontier has closed as forests 
have been declared reserves and as the rest of the 
forest has been already cleared for cocoa and other 
crops. It is no longer possible to ask a chief for a plot in 
the forest to farm: free forest is gone.
Family labour has also become scarcer as children 
go to school and their work in the cocoa groves is 
restricted by labour laws. Other activities compete for 
household labour including crops such as rubber and 
oil palm, galamsey mining, jobs in local market centres, 
and migration to the cities.
Cocoa farming has become more difficult as 
groves of old trees — aged 30 years or older — enter 
in decline and need replanting, and as pests and 
diseases increase — with the most damaging being 
swollen shoot, for which the only remedy is to cut, 
burn, then replant with clean stock.
In response to these three challenges, the institutions 
governing access to land and labour have changed, but 
gradually, with adaptation and evolution of longstanding 
institutions rather than transformation and revolution. 
So, what has changed?
5.1 Land: the new norms
The biggest change has been that land, once vested 
in the lineage and held on behalf of the very extended 
family, with inheritance down the matrilineal line 
through the mother’s brother (wofa), has given way to 
land controlled by the nuclear family, passed down the 
paternal line. This is a sharp break with longstanding 
Akan custom. It has, however, taken place with little 
social rupture.
Matrilineal inheritance was progressively challenged by 
men with land they had cut from the forest, or bought, 
who claimed that this was their land, not land that had 
been passed down within the lineage, and hence they 
could dispose of it as they wished. To make sure that 
when they died lineage elders could not reimpose 
their will, they often passed on their lands in their final 
years as gifts to their offspring, paying due respect 
to custom by having ceremonies with witnesses 
and reporting transfers to chiefs — with small gifts 
to chiefs and elders to ease their recognition of the 
rights transferred. This has led to much land was 
being passed down the generations along paternal 
lines from one generation’s nuclear family to the next 
generation’s nuclear family. There seems to have 
been little resistance to this from elders or chiefs. In 
our interviews, elderly respondents recorded these 
changes, but seem to acquiesce to them.
At the same time, it seems the rights of girls to inherit 
land have increasingly been recognised. Women 
farmers interviewed had less land than their male 
partners, but they had land — either inherited from 
their father, or which had been shared with them by 
their husband.
Land tenure was not necessarily efficient, in that more 
than one third of plots were yielding very little cocoa 
— in part because the farmers lacked labour or capital 
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for inputs to make their plots more productive. That 
problem, however, was closely linked to the rising costs 
and challenges of cocoa production: old trees needing 
replanting, and attacks of swollen shoot, insect pests, 
fungi and mistletoe. 
Land tenure was not equitable, either. That did not, 
however, mean either that land was being monopolised 
so that a class of landowners was able to extract 
rack rents from tenants; or that some farmers were 
accumulating land. If anything, through time, control 
over farmland tended to dissipate.
5.2 Labour: new opportunities, old 
institutions
The institutions governing the availability of labour 
had not changed, but the degree of use of them had. 
Farmers were using less labour from their family. 
Exchange labour groups had declined, being limited 
to small groups that worked collectively on the hard 
work of breaking cocoa pods. Use of sharecropping 
caretakers or caretakers paid an annual fee was 
uncommon. Farmers increasingly were recruiting 
extra labour as hired hands, from gangs being paid 
piece rates.
When interviewed, some farmers reported that it 
was harder to recruit labour than before, owing to 
competition from mining and from jobs in rural market 
centres. However, they usually agreed that if you had 
the cash to pay, you could find labour.
Hence obtaining labour was also a question about 
capital.
While some observers thus see labour as being 
commodified, some arrangements only function with 
much trust and social affiliation — the farmer who puts 
up the annual labourer, a youth from the north, in his 
own house; or the Togolese gangs prepared to work 
and wait until the harvest, trusting the farmers to then 
pay them for their work. These are not the relations of 
hard capitalism, a gig economy in the forest, but more 
typical of relations seen across the world in farm labour 
— where much more than pay for work is transacted.
Landowners have good reason not to drive hard 
bargains: the workers hold the cards when it comes to 
how diligently they work. In cocoa groves, the owner 
cannot stand and watch labour in action: the trees 
get in the way. In any case, farms may be scattered 
plots, making supervision potentially time-consuming. 
Owners must trust their labour: it pays them to deal 
decently with hired hands.
Considerations of hiring labour should not be 
overplayed. Farmers were not using much hired 
labour: the median days reported in the survey was 
just 4.5 days/acre [11 days/ha], with a mean of 6 days/
acre [15.8 days/ha]. The bulk of the labour needed to 
farm came from the farmer and their immediate family. 
Labour hiring was concentrated on the two heavy 
demands: weeding early in the season and harvesting 
at the end of the season. Indeed, as cocoa farms 
become smaller with increasing population, hired 
labour may be becoming less important.
5.3 Women at a disadvantage, even if 
some improvement has been seen
Women are usually disadvantaged in both land and 
labour. Women are likely to get smaller shares of 
inherited land than men. When husbands die, men can 
take advantage of widows, cloaking their land grabs 
under cover of lineage rules. When hiring out their 
labour, women are restricted to the lowest paid tasks 
and their skills are generally not recognised.
Some of the interviews suggest that these inequalities 
are lessening. Patriarchs are more likely to pass on 
some of their land to their daughters. Some farmers 
see that women can carry out tasks seen as skilled 
and male. Nevertheless, the inequalities remain. It is 
easier for men to grow cocoa than women.
5.4 Reflection
We end the discussion on a note for reflection. While 
Ghana still had a forest frontier on which to plant new 
cocoa groves, mobilising land and labour that began 
in the 1880s remained critical to the sector. Today that 
has ended. No frontier remains: the groves run up to 
the Ivorian border. That removes one source of profit: 
the forest rents from newly cleared land. The demand 
for chocolate is growing, rising especially in Asian 
emerging economies.
Hence the challenge for the farmers of Juaboso 
Municipal, both Sefwi and strangers, is this: forest rents 
must be replaced by technical rents. The future lies 
with technical improvement, and with that, injections 
of capital. It is no longer primarily about mobilising land 
and labour. The new agenda invites questions about 
innovation, about state services, and about farmer 
access to capital to invest in upgraded cocoa. A 
subsequent paper will address these issues.
5.5 Policy implications
For policymakers, the following points deserve 
consideration: 
Land tenure. It would be easy to recommend 
changes, such as legal codification of inheritance rules, 
formal registration of all land transactions, however 
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these would be difficult to implement and any rules 
would be hard to enforce. Moreover, if new laws and 
regulations ran against local understandings of what 
is reasonable and fair, they would either be ignored or 
else might produce unwelcome side-effects — such as 
providing cover for the dishonest and unscrupulous to 
grab land. Central government might be wise to leave 
improvements to land tenure to local governments and 
the traditional authorities of chiefs and elders. 
Capital. Considerable areas of cocoa are not farmed 
well because the farmers lack working and investment 
capital. Currently, very few if any farmers have access 
to formal credit, other than the small loans offered by 
purchasing clerks — which evidently are not enough 
to meet demand. Advancing funds to allow farmers 
to buy inputs and hire labour should be a reasonably 
safe investment: the additional cocoa yield should 
more than cover the repayments. The problem for 
commercial lenders is that farmers have many points of 
sale, allowing them to escape repayment by claiming 
they harvested less than expected. Several potential 
solutions may be imagined. One would be to encourage 
rural banks to offer cocoa farmers seasonal loans for 
inputs and labour, with repayments deducted from their 
cocoa sales. That would require all sales from cocoa 
farmers taking loans to be registered with purchasing 
companies who would make the deductions and send 
to the banks to cancel debts. With digital technology 
that should not be difficult. 
To cover losses where farmers have suffered genuine 
misfortune and lost their harvests, insurance might be 
bundled with credits. That, however, would require 
some thought as to how claims could be verified 
without inducing dishonesty. The clearest way to do 
that would be to link claims to some proxy measure 
for failed harvests, but that is hardly possible when 
losses are likely to be idiosyncratic (limited to the 
farmer claiming), the result of unusually virulent attacks 
of pests, fungi and viral disease.
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